

**General Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle**

**AFA - Air and Space Technology Exposition**

**"Viewing the Asia Pacific Rebalance  
Through the Lens of PACAF's Strategy"**

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**General Carlisle:** Thanks, I appreciate it.

Good afternoon everyone. It's great to have everybody here. I know it's after lunch and I think Four Star Forum is next, so hopefully this will keep you reasonably entertained for a while.

Usually in presentations like this at this point the first thing I say is Aloha. I don't use that term here, you can't say it back, because it has a tendency to make people that live here mad. I'm afraid if the Chief hears me say that then he may at some point determine I need to come back here and I'm doing everything in my power to prevent that. So it's good to have everyone here this afternoon. Welcome, and thanks for being part of this.

I do want to ask General Shodd and the folks from AFA to do me one other favor. The deal I want to make is, I'll do this. I'll speak as many times as they want me to as long as they stop using Herbert, because I'm getting really tired of that. I don't like it. I love my parents, I just don't like the name they gave me. So everybody calls me Hawk, we'll stick with that and we'll go from there.

I'll step through this in about a half hour and go through some slides and then I'd be more than willing to take some questions if anybody has anything they'd like to talk about.

It's basically looking at viewing the Asia Pacific shift, the refocus, the balance, rebalance to the Pacific, whatever you want to call it, and what it looks like from a perspective as the senior airman out in the Pacific theater.

If you think about Pacific Air Forces, we have been there since the 1940s and the theater in and of itself kind of defines the strengths and attributes of air power. Speed, range and flexibility. And what we've been doing out there for six decades is providing that stability to our friends, neighbors, partners, in the Asia Pacific area, and ensuring that access to the global commons that we're looking for.

As we look at the environment that we live in, it has its challenge. But we also like to refer to them as opportunities, as most people would. Clearly there are state actors like the 29 year old from North Korea; there are non-state actors and there

are events out there. There's a rising PRC power, a not very transparent rising power. There's competition for global resources. There are territorial disputes. And then on top of that there are the ubiquitous natural disasters that occur in that part of the world, from what happened in Indonesia to the tragedies of the great East Japan earthquake and tsunami.

So those are the challenges that we face. And as we built our strategy and we worked our way through this we took the National Military Strategy and worked our way down to this.

The operational problem, I think everybody's aware of this. The theater's about 8,000 by 9,000 miles. The term we often use is our theater goes from Hollywood to Bollywood and from penguins to polar bears. That's that 8,000 by 9,000 range.

The distance in and of itself, Admiral Locklear likes to use the analogy, you can take every land mass on the planet, put it inside the Pacific, and still have room for another North America and Africa continent on top of that. Thirty-six countries, 15 time zones, a huge area.

On top of that we have what is probably the greatest capable threat out there, potential threat, creating what is often termed the Anti-Access Area Denial environment. That is the ability to push us away. We'll talk about it more as we get into this, but as we all know, people have watched what we've done for the last 20 years and they've seen what air power brings, and their objective in many cases is keep us as far away as they possibly can, and they use a variety of capabilities to do that. But we're not only dealing with a distance problem, we're dealing with an Anti-Access Area Denial problem.

We have what is often termed a strategic triangle from Alaska to Hawaii out to Andersen as a way to project power into the Pacific, as well as great relationships and partnerships with our treaty allies in the area as well.

As most folks know, of the seven mutual defense treaty allies the United States has, five of them are in the Asia Pacific region and those are great allies that we rely on and work with closely every day.

The tactical problem, this is centered on the PRC because they are the pacing threat, as it would be called. They are the most capable. But clearly, if you look at what Russia's doing and what both the PRC and Russia are doing with respect to exporting capability, these advanced capabilities will be ubiquitous throughout the world just because they go to the highest bidder. As has been said in the past by some of our previous Chiefs, we may not necessarily fight China, we will fight their stuff.

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If you look at those things they're using, it's electronic attack in the spectrum that they're able to take advantage of, the advanced jammers today that wreak havoc on some of our systems from GPS jammers to the radar jammers.

We know space and cyber are a contested, denied and very challenging environment and we're in that kind of phase zero plus I think every day, certainly in my AOR, with respect to cyber.

Then as I said before in the A2AD environment, the potential adversaries want to keep us out and missiles have been their mode of operation or choice to make us do that.

Advanced surface-to-air missiles, to deny us the capability to get into the theater, and then land attack missiles, anti-ship missiles, to try to keep air power from being able to rain into their environment. So this is the environment we face every day.

As I said earlier, National Security Strategy through the National Military Strategy is where we derived our PACAF strategy and the rebalance from it. This administration has said that by necessity we will refocus and rebalance to the Asia Pacific region just because of the importance.

As I said earlier 36 countries. It's also 55 percent of the GDP of the entire world is in the Asia Pacific region, and clearly the health and security and stability of the Asia Pacific is key to not only our country but pretty much every country in the world.

So we went down from that through the National Military Strategy to come up with the Pacific Strategy.

My two bosses, obviously Admiral Locklear is the COCOM Combatant Commander out there, has guiding principles that we developed our strategy from, combined with my other boss, General Mark Welsh as the Chief of Staff and his priorities for the Air Force. We developed the Pacific Strategy from all of those documents put together and what we're tasked to do within the region.

You'll hear the term the Pacific or PACAF 3x5. It's three along the vertical axis on the left and the five lines of operation across the horizontal axis. Ultimately the end state is where we need to be. That's what we're tasked to do for our nation, and that is the posture for contingency if we're going to do anything. Everything from humanitarian disaster or phase zero engagement all the way up to what may be a kinetic type of fight.

Security and stability, free access to the global commons within the Asia Pacific region, and then deter aggression and defend U.S. interests as well as our allies and partners and the five mutual defense treaties allies.

The five lines of operation are what we in PACAF have determined that's what we have to do to get to those end states. Starting with theater security cooperation that every day today we get a TCO, a theater campaign order, from Admiral Locklear that tells us what he wants us to do within his theater. That's engagement. That's presence in the AOR, that's building those relationships, building capacity with our friends and partners, building cultural ties, building knowledge of where we're going to go or potentially going to go if we need to go there. It is the entire theater security cooperation.

Second line of operation is integrated air and missile defense. As a senior airman in the Pacific I'm not only the JFAC for Admiral Locklear, I'm also the area air defense commander. As I mentioned before, I think that's one of our biggest problems because our adversaries have looked at how to keep us out, or potential adversaries, how to keep us out, and their primary way is missiles. So how do we defend against that integrated air and missile threat that faces us every day? I will tell you, it's a huge challenge, especially as you look at those growing inventories and growing capabilities. My Navy brethren in PACFLEET, Cecil Haney and soon to be Harry Harris are thinking about exactly the same thing, how do we defend against the integrated air and missile threat that we face?

When you think about that, there are kind of three pillars to the integrated air and missile defense challenge. The first one is attack ops. Clearly the best thing you can do is take the archer out before he shoots, so you go left of launch and try and take that archer out. That's not always easy to do politically, and it's also not always easy to do given where that launcher is.

So although we have to continue to work on that, there are standoff weapons, there's technology. I know industry's working on some things. We have to be able to do that, but that's only one pillar, so that's not the only pillar.

The second pillar is active defense. Active defense is Patriots and THAADs and SM3s and [Tippy 2] radars, and Spy One radars, hopefully JLENS at some point in the not too distant future, and that's the ability to take those missiles out as they're en-route.

Cost imposition strategy says that's not going to work for everything. First of all, just look at the arsenal and the cost of their arsenal versus the cost of our defending missiles. We lose that cost imposition strategy. Plus the numbers just continue to get bigger and bigger. But that's something we also have to continue to be able to do, especially against a potential North Korean threat where the ocean is smaller and our air

defense assets are more capable to deal with what they may throw at us.

The third pillar of that, of course, is passive defense. It's something that we probably haven't thought about enough lately because we haven't felt like we've faced the threat as much lately. But passive defense is everything from concealment, camouflage, deception, flex basing, flush launch disbursement as well as airfield damage repair, being able to bring a runway back up after it gets cratered. FORC which is our fuel operational resilience capability where we take fuel bladders and we move them throughout the airfield, we give them pumping equipment, now we take that one big giant target fuel tank and put it somewhere else and disburse it throughout the field.

Then underneath all of those three lines of operation, which are passive defense, active defense and attack ops, you have to have command and control. And command and control, now you're talking about joint and combined because it's obviously all the systems the United States has in our joint fight as well as our friends and allies. Obviously the Japanese, for example, have great Aegis capability. They have great Patriot capability. I think they're looking at the potential for THAADs and other things as well as on the Korean Peninsula. So that's the second one and that's our second line of operation, huge challenge for us.

Power projection is exactly what General Welsh talked about. It is global vigilance, global reach, power in the Pacific where we need it, when we need it, and how we need to get it there. That is the unique attribute of air power, of speed, range and flexibility, whether it's in an ISR capacity, a global mobility capacity, or in strike or power capacity. It's our ability to do that, to maintain ready forces in the theater to fight tonight if required, or to respond to a natural disaster if required.

The fourth line of operation is agile, flexible C2. And I will tell you that, besides integrated air and missile defense, that's the one that I worry about the most. I think we've all kind of been lulled into a little bit of a security situation where the last at least 12 years, in many cases 20-plus years for the Air Force, everything more than about eight feet above the ground we've owned. So we haven't been denied. Al-Udaid is a CAOC and Al-Kharg before that, they've done amazing work in running two completely separate fights in Iraq and Afghanistan and controlling that. That is not the way it's going to be in my theater of operations. We're going to be denied com, we're going to be targeted in com, we're going to have cyber attacks, we're going to have problems. So our ability to do agile, flexible C2 to meet the need of the warfighter, to do what Admiral Locklear expects me to do as his JFAC and AADC as well as space control authority, is a key component of being able to do what he asks us to do.

The last one of course is our resilient airmen. There's nobody that speaks better to that than our incredible Chief in his presentation yesterday, but clearly our asymmetric advantage the reason we're the greatest Air Force in the world today is because of the airmen that we are incredibly fortunate to be able to have in our Air Force, and they are phenomenal. How we take care of them, how we grow them into being bold and innovative leaders, how we make them comprehensively fit and aware and combat ready to do the mission, have a life balance so they know where their balance sits, and they're mutually supportive and they know that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts and the fact is that everybody's got weaknesses and his strengths are going to cover my weaknesses, and my strengths are going to cover his weaknesses. So how we build those and take care of those airmen to keep the incredible quality we have today and make it even better.

Expand engagement, are the how we're going to get after the what of the five lines of operation.

The first one is expanded engagement. Somebody asked me earlier today, what's the most important thing and I will tell you in the Asia Pacific region in my humble opinion, it's presence. You've got to be there. You've got to get to know the folks, you've got to spend time with them, you've got to go see what the environment is like. You've got to understand what Hollywood to Bollywood really means and how far that is and what it looks like. You have to have our old alliances and make them stronger and continue to grow those relationships and spend time getting to understand and building capacity of yourself as well as your friends and partners; and foster new relationships. We're trying to move from bilateral to multilateral. We get much more bang from the buck and in these times of sequestration that idea of going from bilateral to multilateral pays huge dividends, and it pays huge dividends in many ways.

The other comment I'll make is it is part of the engagement, expanding engagement, is back here at home. The Pacific seems a long ways away, and it is physically, but in reality in today's world it's not. And engagement with our elected leadership as well as everyone inside the Beltway and the American people is the importance of the Asia Pacific region and what it means to our nation.

Increased combat capability, it's hard to do and it's incredibly hard to do in a time of sequestration. You'll hear me say at the end, the rebalance to the Pacific, sequestration slowed us down. This is probably the area that it slowed us down the most because we're facing some huge challenges.

But we owe it to the American people that the next dollar that we spend gives us the most increased combat capability we possibly can get out of it. So we owe them to know exactly what we're doing to make it the best force they can possibly get for the amount of money they spend.

Obviously, and again, the Chief talked about long range platforms, long range strike, and what that means to us. KC-46 with global mobility. And obviously the F-35 for Global Strike, Global Power. And how we do that. The munitions that we need to get out there, the next generation ISR which I will tell you from Admiral Locklear's point, is one of the ones that we have the biggest challenge with.

We need the new systems. And of course I would venture to say every MAJCOM Commander will tell you this, but they need to come to the Pacific first. I said that, so I'll hear more from [Gorence] later and he's a lot bigger than I am, so he may not like that. But it's true. It needs to go out to the Pacific first.

Then we need to look at how we do TTPs, how we do the passive defense that I talked about with respect to hardening, and being able to take a punch and continue to operate, to continue to generate air power, to do what the combatant commander needs us to do in the area. So how we do that, how we do info sharing with our friends and partners, how do we pass data? How do we provide intel in some environment where we're sharing information with the Japanese? How do we do that to the max extent possible and get the most out of it?

So everything we do with respect to increased combat power is how do we gain that capability?

Improve warfighter integration is exactly what it sounds like. We in the Air Force, the second core tenet of improved warfighter integration, or actually the last one, is you have to be able to work across all of our domains -- air, space and cyberspace -- and use the integration efforts in those lines of operation of air, space and cyberspace. Then you have to take AirSea Battle, integrated air and missile defense, and the ability to take advantage of the entire joint and coalition team. So you have to get to working with your allies and how do you integrate their capability? How do you build the net so that you have all players on it and you're passing the most recent data and information possible?

In the command and control realm, how do you bring in joint coalition and in some cases even non-governmental in the case of the Tomadachi exercise, non-governmental agencies into the organization so that they have the same command and control and

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they have the same knowledge base that you do and you build the same picture?

So our ability to integrate, it's the heart of AirSea Battle, of what it is. It's the heart of integrated air and missile defense that is by nature joint, and how we integrate. Again, the key is that our ability to work across those domains gives us an order of magnitude greater capability for the same amount of money you spend to get there.

So improved warfighter integration is paramount to that.

The five lines of operation. The operational support. It's our airmen out there every day. Every airman is an ambassador. It's working in phase zero day in and day out, all the way through what may be asked of us in the higher fidelity environment.

Going back to the engagement portion, theater security cooperation. This is what we did in FY12. It was about 200 engagements with 28 different nations. It was a very successful year. I will tell you, in my impression this or more than this is what we need to do in the AOR every year. That's what we strive for. That's what Admiral Locklear wants us to do. That's the presence that I'm talking about with respect to the full spectrum, whether it's HADR in a PAC Angel type environment, or it's high fidelity training in a Red Flag Alaska up at JPARK. Or it's a subject matter expert exchange with the Philippines on how to do depot maintenance on a C-130. It covers that whole spectrum.

In FY13 it was not so good. Obviously everybody knows what happened. We were halfway through the year and then as an O&M command, that's the only place that money was taken from me and it was a significant problem with respect to continuing our engagements.

Most of these were a huge challenge with respect to not only just the training that we lost, but also with respect to our friends and partners, the promises that we had made. Building their capacity up, building the relationships with them.

In the case of Red Flag Nellis that was canceled, we'd gone to Air Chief Marshal Brown and said hey, you know, Red Flag, Nellis is very important, we'd love to have you there. He kind of went all-in with his government. Traded in some green stamps to make sure that he'd get to go. A month later I had to call him up and say sorry, it's canceled. That's hard with respect to engagement.

What we've done for FY14 is prepare ourselves with this is what we're going forward with. I don't think this will happen and I don't think it will happen because we all, I think everybody

realizes we have no idea what the budget actually is going to look like. This is what we built based on the President's Budget that went forward. The President's Budget obviously, given where we're at, probable continuing resolution for X amount of time, is going to drive us away from this.

My strategy with respect to this is I'm still going to try to do every piece of this, I'm just going to shrink the footprint and scope down as much as I have to to get within the amount of money that I have to spend. But it's about 40 different engagements. It's not enough even if we did them full scale, but right now it's the best I can do with where I'm sitting.

Let me mention a couple of things that we're doing and then I'll be ready for questions.

One of the things that we're doing for all of our lines of operation is Operation Pac Angel. We did five this year. We went to Vietnam, Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Philippines, and Indonesia I think. Incredibly valuable. It's a joint and combined team and it also includes non-governmental agencies. We take medics, dentists, veterinarians, and engineering capability and we go to countries, an area in a country that has some challenges. We also bring that country's military with us and we bring that country's government officials with us at their invite, and we basically do medical, dental and veterinarian work. We generally do some construction and build something. But more importantly, we work with those nations' government and military to not only train them but to build them up within their own populace, and leave something behind. We leave them medical training for their docs that are there. We leave them veterinarian training. And we leave them engineering training.

Hugely successful. We did five last year. Very very valuable for our building partnership capacity as well as building theater security cooperation and we have four scheduled for next year. I think we're going to Mongolia, Laos, Tonga, and one other one.

I talked about integrated air and missile defense. As I said, I kind of went through this at the outset, but it really is, it's three pillars with command and control underlying it and our ability to do this with our friends and partners and how we grow that is the challenge that we're trying to work our way through. Again, we have to do all of these.

Right now we've kind of left passive defense for a while and we're working hard on how to make that better.

That's the three pillars that I mentioned before.

Power projection -- global vigilance, global reach, global power in the AOR and how do we get there? Our ability to project ISR

capability, to project mobility to put things wherever we can. I love my Navy, they're incredibly valuable, but we move in hours where they move in days. So the speed, range and flexibility and being able to get there when it needs in a short period of time is incredibly important in our ability to do power projection, whether it's in the ISR realm or the global mobility or global strike.

That's what our theater Air Force looked like. I think Dave may have said something at the outset. It's about 45,000 people. 350 or so permanently assigned to aircraft. On any given day I have 50 to 75 to 80 additional aircraft deployed to the theater, so it's about 425, 400 to 425 aircraft at any given time. Again, that's where we're located currently in the AOR.

Another example with respect to our core tenets and our lines of operation, we do Operation Deep Freeze. We're the standing joint task force commander for support forces Antarctica. It goes to penguins. They have folks that stay down there and winter over. The picture in the upper left is McMurdoch's Station. It's on Ross Island down in McMurdoch. In April of this year one of the scientists who was doing a winter over in Antarctica got deathly ill and we had to get him out. So it's the middle of winter there, dark 100 percent of the time, temperatures in the minus 50 to minus 80 Fahrenheit type realm. We got notified was had to get the doctor out. Sixty hours. We took a C-17 out of McCord, landed it at Christ Church, put docs on it at Christ Church, left Christ Church, landed at McMurdoch, spent about 30 minutes on the ground, uploaded the patient, got back to Christ Church and had him in the hospital 60 hours from notification. Again, that's a capability that is something that we do every day, really. It's amazing. But it is another example of how our combat capability and power projection, there's not many other ways that you can take care of a guy like that.

Exercise Full Eagle. Most people have heard this. We have an annual exercise that's been going on with the Koreans since 1997. This year Full Eagle took place in the middle of the North Korean provocation. The bottom right picture is the Navy doing its work in Full Eagle. Many warships out there. We took some paratroopers, the lower left hand picture there, a bunch of paratroopers from the Korean Air Force, C-130s out of Yakota and did some jump training with those guys. Incredibly valuable and probably the most notable was the 37.5 hour B-2 mission from Whiteman. They took off, got passed from three different AOCs, finally get chopped into theater, dropped ordnance in the Pilsang range, have two F-16s join up on them and do a low approach at Osan, just because we could. I will tell you that the low approach at Kunsan was on YouTube and on social media within an hour of the event. So we got exactly what we wanted out of the event. But again, a demonstration of projecting power. I would

venture to say there's not another nation in the world that can do what we did in that case.

Agile flexible C-2. I talked about this. This is our challenge today in that we know we're going to be contested in this environment, in this AOR, and how we deal with it.

The next slide will go to what we talk about -- Distributed control. Centralized command, distributed command, and decentralized execution. We've always talked about centralized command/decentralized execution. The command and control is two different words so we really have to think about how we're going to do command and control in this AOR. We know we're going to be contested, we know there's going to be challenges, we know there's a huge shortfall of commercial com. I spent some time this morning getting to know how bad that situation really is. As well as other com. So when we talk about distributed control, how do we know we're going to that? When we go down to a thin blue line of com, because we'll get some but we won't get it all. When we go down to a thin blue line of com, how do I prioritize and know what com we're getting? And what we're actually prioritizing, how we're prioritizing it. And how do we take mission-type orders and send them to the TAOC or the 7<sup>th</sup> Fleet or the ADC headquarters at Yakota where the ADC and 5<sup>th</sup> Air Force are sitting side by side? So we have to figure out how to do that and that's part of this agile flexible command and control that we're going to.

This is a recent success. I'll tell you when you talk about expand engagement, theater security cooperation, if you notice on that previous chart we were able to do a Red Flag Alaska in August. It was significantly reduced because of money. We had WESTPAC units that were supposed to participate from the United States. Osan in particular was going to be the lead wing. They were not able to go because of obviously sequester. But we were able to get the aggressors flying again because they had been grounded for about three months. We had the F-22s participating. The Australians participated and they brought their Wedge Tail up. The JASDAF participated. They brought their JWACS and their F-15Js. And the ROKAF, the first time in history the ROKAF deployed F-15s off peninsula with our KC-135s and participated in Red Flag Alaska.

It was scaled down, it wasn't what we wanted it to be, but it was an incredible success in building partnership capacity, in learning interoperability with those four nations together, the fidelity of the exercise was fantastic and the learning curve was on the far end of the scale.

At the same time we had what's called the Executive Observer Program and we invited 14 other nations to come in and look at what Red Flag Alaska looks like. Again, many of those nations

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got to see how valuable the training and what quality of high fidelity training that JPARK and Red Flag Alaska gives them.

Our final line operation I talked about was resilient airmen. I don't think you can say enough about this. Our asymmetric advantage rests with these young men and women that raise their right hand and swear an oath to our constitution.

We've got to do everything we can to take care of them. We've got to still recruit them and retain them at the same level. We've got to keep the families and take care of them. We've got to build that bold and innovative leadership that the Chief talks about. We talk about comprehensively fit, and where they have to have a balanced life and understand that they can establish priorities. They don't have to work 18 hours a day and they can still do great in their careers and be incredibly successful.

We've got to make them combat ready. We've got to give them the equipment. I will tell you that, and the Chief alluded to it when he had the board slide up there yesterday. But the thing, when I went out and talked to my airmen after sequestration, the thing that drove them crazy was I can't do my job, boss. I'm supposed to be fixing this airplane and I can't. I can't do the depot work. I can't do the engine work. We don't have the money. So the most frustrating thing was the fact that we couldn't let those folks do their job.

Then the mutually supportive part of resilient airmen is we've got to be there for each other and we've got to -- All the problems we have as the Chief said, we can work our way through if we take care of one another.

My belief is that 99, whatever huge percent of the force, would not think of doing anything of those tragic acts that are happening. So that 99 percent needs to find that 1 percent and stop it. That's mutual support and that's how we're going to fix this.

This last slide, that young gentleman on the left there is Lieutenant Dennis Kirkland. He's an Air National Guardsman. He's part of the Guam Air National Guard. He works in the air base group. You can see he has a hard time fitting in with people. The war paint is in the line of duty.

He basically volunteered, left his civilian job, took man days and filled in for chaplains that were deployed out of Andersen into the AOR.

That picture is taken at one of the children's events and he volunteered to get his face painted so he obviously was fired up about it.

The young lady on the right there is Staff Sergeant Shaya Greenland. She is a unit deployment manager for the 8<sup>th</sup> Maintenance Squadron in Kunsan. Incredible young lady. She is kind of the heart of fight tonight and receive follow-on forces. Anybody that's been to Kunsan recognizes those words well. But she has done 3,000 people have come and left from Kunsan and she's the one that's processing them in and processing them out. She led her squadron to two excellent ratings and inspections. She's determined, and she's been called by her squadron the glue that holds this squadron together. Just an incredible young lady.

Of course in her spare time she got a bachelor of science degree in social psychology; she's applied for her graduate level degree; and she teaches English to Korean children downtown.

That is resilient airmen, and that's how we'll continue to be the greatest Air Force in the world is because we have folks like that.

The final take-aways. Pacific rebalance. We are fully engaged. I will tell you that as a sea MAJCOM working for Admiral Locklear and General Welsh out there, my job is engagement and making our airmen out there be the most productive and capable airmen they can possibly be.

Sequester is slowing us down. There's no two ways about it. It is a bit of a challenge. But it's not stopping us by any stretch of the imagination and all of our foreign friends that are here need to understand that this fiscal constraint today is no indication whatsoever of our long term commitment to the Asia Pacific region and what it means to us.

As I said before, presence, those relationships, the understanding of the AOR, the understanding of the people that you're working with in those other nations is fundamental to the security and stability in the Asia Pacific region.

Finally, as I said, our airmen are absolutely incredible. I stand up every day and go man, I don't believe I get to work with this quality of people day in and day in and day out. They absolutely will continue to dazzle you in everything they do.

I think that's it. Dave, if there are questions, I'd be more than happy to answer any of them. Again, folks, thanks for being here. I appreciate the opportunity to talk about PACAF and what we're doing out there. Thank you.

**Moderator:** Thanks, General Carlisle, for that great tour de force of 15-plus time zones. Obviously that's generated some questions so we'll jump right in. We've got about 10 minutes, which is good. Thanks for building in time for this.

One of the lines that you used earlier today was places, not bases. So considering that, how welcome is the Air Force at airfields in the friendly of the 38 nations that are out there? And can we count on access when the chips are down?

**General Carlisle:** That's a great question and that is kind of the heart of the expand engagement, theater security cooperation. We're not building any more bases. We have nine bases, ten wings in PACAF and that's not going to change.

But we have a lot of nations that really enjoy the opportunity to train with us, practice with us, and engage with us. When we go to their bases as well as them coming to ours like Red Flag Alaska. Cope North is another example of Andersen when the Australians and the Japanese. Last year the ROKAF came in as well.

So the ability to use those bases and do it on their request, on the friendly nation's request, is pretty good, there's not a challenge with that.

Again, it's a win/win. So we deploy to Thailand, we deploy to Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Philippines. We bring a training capacity. We help them. We pass on lessons learned in data, and we learn from them as well. We learn about the environment. We learn about the culture. We learn about what their capacity and capability is. We learn about the airfields we're operating on. So the opportunities are endless. The engagement that I showed you is the low end of the spectrum. We can do more than that.

The tougher question is probably, are they going to be there when the times get tough? First of all, we have five mutual defense treaty allies out there with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia and Thailand. So you know they're going to be there. We're part of a mutual defense treaty with them. There's a political component to that of when and how and what happens. And that clearly is something that will be waged. We saw it obviously with coming out of Turkey and Iraqi Freedom and how that did or did not work. But it's something that you just have to be able to work with and prepare for the places and train to and then as the environment evolves, how well you're able to execute those.

Again, in most cases I will tell you I think in the Asia Pacific region those areas are going to be open to us.

**Moderator:** On a related subject, North Korea changed its behavior pretty quickly when the Raptors and the B-2 that you described showed up. What does that mean for basing or rotation of our most advanced aircraft on the peninsula?

**General Carlisle:** We just had B-2s at Andersen about six months ago. They stopped through en-route to Diego. We've had them there before. We bring B-2s fairly often. F-22s continuously rotate to the Asia Pacific in blocks, in different times. We have a 12-ship there right now. So I think you look at where they're based and then the deployments. I think it will stay the same if not increase depending on what the National Command Authorities and what the global force management looks like when we move them around. But there's no restriction to it.

**Moderator:** Here's a related question. Given the tyranny of distance that we often hear about and the fact that probably the best way to conquer that is by going 600 knots instead of 20 knots, what are your thoughts regarding the highest priority Air Force programs necessary to sustain the margin of deterrence in Asia into the 2020?

**General Carlisle:** I think that the Chief laid them out. Long range strike is incredibly important. I will tell you it's incredibly important to Admiral Locklear as well. Our ability to do B-2 type stuff at a scale that is required for the Asia Pacific region, the long range strike platform, and that family of systems is incredibly important and as senior airmen we have to have that capability.

Fifth generation capability, F-22s, F-35s. We know that the most capable out there is PRC; Russia is not far behind. They're both fairly extensively in the Asia Pacific region. So clearly our ability to have 5<sup>th</sup> gen aircraft as well as munitions, ISR capability to go with that as part of the family of systems. And then of course the KC-46. You really have to launch out of Andersen someday and go okay, where am I going next? And nine hours later when you get somewhere you go man, it's a long ways out here.

It really is. To get the breadth and width of what that AOR looks like you have to spend a few days on an airplane figuring out how big it really is. But that tanker capacity is critical not just for us. Actually all three of those platforms are critical for the joint fight. Our tankers, our ISR, our mobility does the entire joint fight and our 5<sup>th</sup> generation strike's going to be paramount to be able to get into that theater. So those are the programs that I would reference.

**Moderator:** A former Secretary of Defense said publicly that in the mid 2020's the U.S. would have over 500 5<sup>th</sup> generation fighters and the Chinese just a handful. Is this estimate still current?

**General Carlisle:** I don't know if Chris Bogdan's here. I know we have 183 F-22s. I don't think we'll have 500 -- Well, we may. I don't know what our F-35 numbers are going to be.

The problem with that statistic is it doesn't tell you anything. Their 5<sup>th</sup> generation, they have thousands of missiles pointed west. They have an incredibly capable surface-to-air missile threat. They have incredibly capable jamming and EW. They may not need 5<sup>th</sup> generation. The famous quote, it's a home game for them. If something happens in the Asia Pacific, it's a home game and we're traveling a little bit.

I don't know if the estimate's still accurate. I don't think it is. We have seen the J-20 and obviously the PAC F-A from Russia, so there are 5<sup>th</sup> generation developments out there. The actual numbers I think we'd have to go to intel to get the numbers. But again, I don't think that number means much, to be perfectly honest.

**Moderator:** On the building partnership capacity front, how do we convince reluctant partners to engage multilaterally versus bilaterally?

**General Carlisle:** It's a tough challenge. There's cultural differences, past events that have occurred that create some kind of friction between nations. I think the best way to work it in the future, and we've made success. I will tell you this. Red Flag Alaska just happened, even though it was scaled down it was ragingly successful. So I would say that we continue to offer that high fidelity, high quality training. If you go up to the JPARK and see the threat layout, the size of the airspace -- It's phenomenal. So getting folks to participate in that.

Cope North is another example where we've gone to trilateral. We're trying to get even bigger than that.

I think the best way is to continue to show the benefit. And try to work with them to put any friction or past things behind them and work towards the future and the capability that they can gain by doing these multilateral exercise.

**Moderator:** Last question. You said that presence is extremely important in your theater for executing your overall plans. If more capability goes into the Air Reserve component, can you meet the need for rotational presence?

**General Carlisle:** Again, it's a great question. The reserve component has some great attributes to it as does the active component and they're different.

The rotational presence that would be required, and we'd have to look at all the COCOMs and see what CENTCOM wanted and EUCOM

wanted and what PACOM wanted. But the rotational presence is a challenge if you're just counting on volunteerism. It doesn't, you can mobilize, but again, that has a challenge in and of itself.

So as we look at the force sizing construct, which is right now being worked at the OSD level, and how you size the force. Then with that force that's remaining, if you put a force sizing construct that's a rotational presence at a fairly high level in multiple COCOMs it can be challenging to have too much force structure in the reserve component. We have TF2 going on, they're doing some incredible work. There's a lot of work left to do with that, but it is a challenge.

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