Cold War space approach must change

  • Published
  • By Rudi Williams
  • American Forces Press Service
Transformation across the armed forces is happening much faster than expected when the concept was announced two years ago, the Defense Department's director of force transformation told the Senate subcommittee on strategic forces.

"It's happening due in large part to the information and power derived from our vital space capabilities," said retired Navy Vice Adm. Arthur K. Cebrowski in prepared testimony.

Changes must be made in the United States' Cold War space approach, he said, adding that in today's rapidly changing, dynamic world, the nation must continue to lead in all space operations to assure national security and freedom of action.

Space capabilities are a prominent feature of the global advantage the nation enjoys, but space technology's context is changing, making possible more space-business models and expanded-business bases, Admiral Cebrowski said. He suggested using a new and complementary-business model called "Operationally Responsive Space" to help ensure space superiority well into the future, with space being more responsive to joint-military forces.

At the program's core, he said, is defining a joint-military function and focusing on providing joint-military capabilities for operational- and tactical-level commanders.

The progress of space transformation, which is rooted in the Cold War, is phenomenal, he said. The national security space program was viewed as a source of national power with a clear connection between space and the nation's strategic-deterrent forces.

After capitalizing on converted-weapon systems to develop the ability to launch small payloads in low-Earth orbit, the United States graduated to larger payloads in higher orbits. This was vital for detecting the ballistic-missile threat posed by the former Soviet Union, Admiral Cebrowski said.

"Thirty years later, the military value of space capabilities became apparent during Operation Desert Storm, which many have deemed the first space war," he said. "Our space forces used a robust Cold War-force structure to defeat the Iraqi armed forces and expel them from Kuwait.

"One need only to compare Desert Storm with Operation Enduring Freedom or Operation Iraqi Freedom to see how successful we've been at (using) our global-space forces," Admiral Cebrowski said. "One of the key differences between Desert Storm and Operation Iraqi Freedom is the distribution of satellite-based wideband communications down to the tactical level."

He said 542,000 servicemembers participated in Desert Storm with 99 MB per second of communications bandwidth available. This rose to 3,200 MB per second during operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, and the number of U.S. forces was reduced to 350,000.

"The nation's space capabilities directly (affected) speed of maneuver, the tempo of the fight, and the boldness and lethality of our forces," the admiral said. "In the years leading up to Operation Iraqi Freedom, great advances were made in distributing the Global Positioning System signal to weapons. This has significantly increased our precision-strike capability.

He said these examples and others "show just how important space capabilities are to transforming our force and how far we've come in (using) these capabilities."

Admiral Cebrowski emphasized that the U.S. military is the most heavily space-dependent force in the world.

Describing oceans as a "great common," he said, today, space and cyberspace must be added to the list of commons that must be controlled. Two of the barriers to becoming a dominant power are operating in and controlling the commons, he said.

"Therefore, we can expect nations with (hegemonistic) aspirations to try to erode our ability to operate effectively in the commons and to achieve the ability to control the commons for their own use," he said.

Barriers to entering space, which were so high during the Cold War, have eroded, Admiral Cebrowski said. "No longer is space reserved for great power nations alone."

A nation does not have to be a space power to use space power, he said. The commercial space-communication and remote-sensing industries that emerged in the 1990s provide power derived from space. It was once reserved for the most powerful nations, and now is available to weaker nations, organizations and even individuals.

Even though the United States is the world leader in space, the nation has taken a back seat to other nations in exploiting smaller segments of the space industry, the admiral said.

"In the past two years, other nations have launched 38 (microsatellites) while our contribution in this segment of the market is very modest," he said. "Furthermore, our space-test program, as indicated by the number of satellites launched for test, is in decline. The Cold War attributes of our existing space program limit our ability to maintain [the] space superiority required by today's rapidly changing strategic environment."

Admiral Cebrowski said the expensive, long-lasting, heavy and multimission payloads of the Cold War approach hurts the nation's ability to launch today's satellites into orbit. That is because they require larger, higher-cost launch vehicles with low-launch rates and significant mission-assurance oversight.

The new space model designs military capabilities directly for the operational commander. In other words, he said, "field commanders drive the demand."

"The demand is the joint-military capability required to meet operational and tactical needs," Admiral Cebrowski said. "Rather than treating our operational- and tactical-level commanders as 'lesser includeds,' this business model designs a capability to meet their specific warfighting needs."

The approach, he said, changes the space calculus and the cost. It also changes the risk and mission-criticality variables, and it is an incentive to lower-cost, smaller satellites and single-mission and suboptimized payloads with shorter life spans.

Admiral Cebrowski said the smaller-space program does not replace the larger program.

"Small satellites can't provide the capabilities required to meet all national-intelligence needs," he said.

The smaller satellites will help reduce the burden on the national systems and help ensure that U.S. forces are adaptable to an uncertain future, the admiral said.

"Today our space forces are at risk of becoming a strategically fixed target," he said. "The cost of sticking to slower generational turnover -- a cycle that currently runs 15 to 25 years for U.S. forces -- is likely to be technological surprise that works to our disadvantage in future conflicts. Sound space science and technology stewardship requires that the sole superpower compete with itself to avoid stagnation."

The admiral said getting new technologies into space earlier builds a learning curve for "big space" and provides a look at alternative futures.

"By reducing (costs), increasing transaction rates and developing standardized buses and interfaces, we change our risk mitigation strategy," he said. "This will allow the United States to lower the cost of placing payloads into low-Earth orbit and simultaneously increase our ability to put research and development payloads into space."